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Abstract 
In this paper I reject the claim that the responsibilities acquired by 
gamete providers can be transferred to their biological children’s 
intending parents. I defend this position by first showing that 
arguments in defense of the transferability of responsibilities in 
gamete provision cases fail to distinguish between the transfer and 
delegation of responsibility. I then provide an argument against the 
transferability of responsibilities in gamete provision cases that 
differs from the ones offered by James Lindemann Nelson and Rivka 
Weinberg. Though I conclude that gamete providers have inalienable 
responsibilities towards their biological offspring, I note that the 
precise ethical and policy implications this has for gamete provision 
remain somewhat unclear. 
Introduction 
A view held by many authors is that gamete providers1 can transfer any 
responsibilities they may acquire towards their biological offspring to the 
children’s intending parent(s).2 If true, then gamete providers need not be 
too concerned about what responsibilities arise from assisting in the 
creation of new life, as any responsibilities that do arise can be transferred 
to others. In support of the claim that gamete providers’ responsibilities are 
transferable, some authors point to the commonplace outsourcing of 
various parental responsibilities, such as education and supervision, which 
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are generally thought to be uncontroversial. However, despite their seeming 
plausibility, I show that these arguments fail to properly distinguish 
between the transfer and delegation of responsibility. On closer 
examination, these arguments only support the possibility of the delegation 
of responsibility. I further argue that there are strong reasons to think 
gamete providers’ responsibilities cannot be transferred to others. 
Consequently, gamete providers ought to be concerned about the 
responsibilities they acquire towards their offspring. 
In the first section of this paper I outline what I consider to be the 
ordinary language distinction between the transfer and delegation of 
responsibility. In the second section I demonstrate two things. First, that 
many authors fail to take this distinction into account when discussing 
gamete providers’ responsibilities. Second, that at best arguments claiming 
to demonstrate the plausibility of transfers of responsibility in gamete 
provision cases in fact demonstrate the plausibility of delegations of 
responsibility. In the third section I argue that the kind of responsibilities 
gamete providers likely have can only be delegated, and not transferred. 
Otherwise put, because gamete providers’ responsibilities cannot be 
transferred, we ought to think of them as inalienable. Though I conclude 
that gamete providers cannot alienate their responsibilities, in the final 
section of the paper I note that the precise implications this has for gamete 
providers and policy governing gamete provision is not clear. 
On a terminological note, ‘responsibility’ can be used to designate a host 
of related concepts, such as blameworthiness, obligation, etc.3 Throughout 
this paper I use responsibility in the forward looking sense; I use 
‘responsibility’ to designate the obligation(s) an individual acquires to work 
towards bringing about a certain state of affairs - in this case the well-being 
of certain children. What I have in mind is quite similar to what Claudia 
Card calls the care-taking sense of responsibility, which is the duty to stand 
behind something, make it good, or make right one’s failure to do so.4 
1 Ordinary Language Delegation and 
Transfer 
Delegating and transferring are two ways of assigning responsibilities to a 
third party that are or were possessed by another individual. The difference 
between the two is best illustrated through an example. 
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Peter and Mary are both executive members of a student 
government. Peter is in charge of internal academic affairs and 
Mary is in charge of communication, including the production of 
a weekly student newsletter. The student government meets in 
order to review the different executive portfolios, and everyone 
agrees that it would be better for the internal academic officer 
(Peter) to take over production of the weekly newsletter, 
allowing the communications officer (Mary) to focus on external 
communication. Peter then solicits a volunteer, Charlie, to 
produce the page layout for the October newsletter. 
 
In this example, both a transfer and a delegation of responsibility have 
occurred. Using an ordinary-language description, we would say that the 
responsibility for producing the weekly newsletter was transferred to Peter, 
and the job of creating the page layout for the October issue was delegated 
to Charlie. This is not just a semantic difference, for it highlights important 
features of the nature of the responsibilities that each individual has after 
the meeting. Following the reconfiguration of the responsibilities attached 
to each portfolio, we do not think that Mary has any special residual 
obligation to ensure that the weekly newsletter gets produced.5 For 
instance, if Charlie shirks his responsibility and fails to produce the page 
layout for the newsletter we do not think that Mary should be blamed, nor 
do we think that Mary has a duty to ensure that the newsletter gets 
produced. By contrast, we think that Peter might be to blame if Charlie fails 
to produce the page layout —for example, if there was good reason to 
distrust Charlie’s commitment to the task and more competent volunteers 
were available. However, regardless of whether Peter is to blame, if Charlie 
does not complete the task, then we do think that Peter has an obligation to 
either complete the page layout himself or find someone else to do it. 
Furthermore, Peter seems obliged to ‘make right’ any negative 
consequences that arise from Charlie’s poor performance. For instance, 
Peter might be reasonably expected to apologize to a company whose 
advertisement gets cut as a result of Charlie’s failure to complete the layout 
in a timely fashion. Conversely, Mary has no such obligation. 
When responsibilities are transferred, the person initially bound by 
them no longer has any trace of them. By contrast, when a responsibility is 
delegated, the individual initially bound by the responsibility still has the 
obligation to ensure that the responsibility gets fulfilled. Note that in the 
case of delegation, we might think that so long as the delegator had good 
reason to think the delegatee would complete the assigned task, she is not 
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blameworthy if things go awry. For instance, we would not find Peter 
blameworthy if Charlie could not complete the task due to an illness. 
However, the delegator still retains the obligation to ensure that the task 
gets completed, and/or to make up for whatever negative consequences 
arise due to the delegatee’s failure to fulfil her responsibilities, even in the 
absence of blame. 
2 Transfer and Delegation in the 
Gamete Provision Literature 
The preceding distinction between the delegation and transfer of 
responsibilities is important because gamete providers could be like Peter 
rather than Mary, and thus have an ongoing obligation to both ensure that 
the delegated responsibilities are fulfilled, and make right any shortfalls of 
the delegatee(s). Such a result would be in contrast with the view that 
gamete providers can completely discharge their responsibilities by finding 
suitable parents for their biological offspring,6 and in tension with legal 
norms that generally recognize no ongoing responsibilities for gamete 
providers, at least when the proper mechanisms are employed.7 Although 
this distinction between transfer and delegation carries much normative 
weight, it is one that has either been ignored or not properly taken into 
consideration when discussing the structure of the responsibilities that 
arise following gamete provision. 
Consider how Giuliana Fuscaldo and Onora O’Neill discuss the manner in 
which procreators can divest themselves of the obligations they have 
towards their offspring. Fuscaldo states, “in support of the claim that 
parental duties are transferable, we already recognize and accept the 
transfer of at least some of our parental duties, for example to nannies, 
tennis coaches, doctors and teachers. In fact we regard as negligent in many 
cases a parent who fails to delegate some of their parental duties to 
someone who could do a better job.”8 (emphasis added). This passage 
employs transfer and delegation interchangeably; Fuscaldo seems to 
suggest that putting a child in the temporary care of others can equally be 
described as either the transfer or delegation of responsibility.9 
Similarly, in a discussion of reproducers’ responsibilities,10 Onora O’Neill 
fails to clearly differentiate delegation from transfer. O’Neill states, 
“begetters and bearers have at various times delegated or transferred some 
or all of their tasks to wet nurses, relations, tutors, servants, foster homes, 
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and schools including boarding schools. Provided that they take reasonable 
steps to ensure that their children will be adequately reared, they do not 
breach but transfer their parental obligations or some part of those 
obligations” (emphasis added).11 Here O’Neill is unclear about which of the 
examples are delegations, and which are transfers. Additionally, since the 
conclusion that O’Neill draws from these examples refers only to transfer, it 
is unclear whether she thinks the distinction is important at all. 
Despite this ambiguity, someone might take the examples appealed to by 
O’Neill and Fuscaldo, like placing children in boarding schools, as evidence 
that transferring parental responsibilities is largely unproblematic so long 
as the transferer takes due care when selecting others to fulfill the 
responsibilities. However, upon closer examination, these examples suggest 
that what is commonplace is delegation and not transfer. Consider the 
following analysis of supposedly transferring responsibilities to a nanny. 
Imagine that a parent puts a child in the care of a nanny for an evening, 
but a few hours before the parent had arranged to return the nanny calls to 
say that she has decided to leave early. It is quite clear that the parent 
cannot simply leave her child unattended, but must either return home or 
arrange for someone else to care for the child. The claim that the 
responsibility to look after the child had been transferred to the nanny for 
the entire evening is no excuse for leaving the child unattended. The parent 
is thus more like Peter, who must ensure that the responsibilities he 
delegates get fulfilled, than Mary who retains no such responsibility. 
The same holds true for the other specific examples offered by Fuscaldo 
and O’Neill, including putting a child in the care of teachers and doctors. If it 
becomes clear that a doctor or a teacher is failing in their responsibility to 
meet a child’s medical or educational needs, the child’s parent(s) have the 
responsibility to find other people to fulfill the child’s needs, or fulfill them 
themselves if possible. Consequently, the ability to transfer responsibilities 
in gamete provision cannot be justified on the grounds that it is 
commonplace for parents to transfer some of their responsibilities to 
others. As has been shown, in the case of parenting responsibility is 
normally delegated and not transferred. This of course does not mean that 
parents are necessarily blameworthy if the individual to whom they 
delegate responsibilities fails to fulfill them, just as Peter is not 
blameworthy if Charlie cannot complete the newsletter on account of 
illness.  
While the examples employed by Fuscaldo and O’Neill do not establish 
that transferring responsibilities is commonplace in parenting, this by itself 
does not show that transferring parental responsibilities is impossible in all 
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cases. In the following sections I will explain why I think that transfers of 
responsibility are not possible in gamete provision cases, and distinguish 
my account from similar arguments made by others. 
2.1 Permissibility of Transfers of Responsibilities in 
Reproduction 
Other authors have questioned whether gamete providers can permissibly 
transfer any responsibilities they have towards their genetic offspring to 
others, but their arguments have tended to focus on the content of gamete 
providers’ obligations. For instance, James Lindemann Nelson argues that if 
an individual has particularly weighty responsibilities, it is impermissible 
for her to transfer them to someone else if she could fulfil them herself. 
Nelson thinks this is the case because it is hard to predict how someone else 
will behave in the future, but an individual can always force herself to act to 
fulfil her responsibilities.12 Since Nelson thinks that gamete providers 
acquire very weighty responsibilities, he concludes that these cannot be 
transferred to others. 
However, there is reason to be sceptical of the strength of Nelson’s 
conclusion. Though we may sometimes feel that a specific responsibility is 
so important that we should fulfil it ourselves, this is not sufficient to show 
that certain responsibilities are so weighty that it is unethical to divest of 
them by transferring them to others. Consider a sperm provider who 
concludes that he is unlikely to be able to provide a stable environment to 
raise a child, and that the child he helps create is much more likely to have a 
good life if put in the care of others. In this case it seems far from obvious 
that the gamete provider acts immorally by having others rear the child he 
helps create.13 There are also cases where transfers of weighty 
responsibilities seem acceptable even if the transferers could fulfil the 
responsibility themselves. For instance, it seems perfectly permissible for 
an emergency care physician to transfer her responsibility for the care of 
patients to an equally capable colleague by swapping shifts, even if she 
could abide by the original schedule. 
Rivka Weinberg argues that certain kinds of responsibilities must be 
fulfilled by specific individuals.14 For example, a person’s duty to comfort 
her partner in a time of emotional distress cannot be transferred to another 
individual. In cases where duties arise from intimate relationships, the 
identity of the person fulfilling the responsibility is often non-fungible. 
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Weinberg argues that the duty to love one’s children is a paradigmatic 
case of the kind of responsibility that cannot be transferred to other people. 
Since Weinberg thinks that gamete providers acquire intimate duties 
towards the children they help create, she argues that at least some of their 
responsibilities cannot be transferred to others. Furthermore, since these 
responsibilities cannot be fulfilled by anyone but those in the intimate 
relationship with the child, these responsibilities cannot be delegated 
either.15 
Though Weinberg is right to point out that certain responsibilities that 
are intimate in nature cannot be transferred to others, that such 
responsibilities arise for gamete providers in the first place is quite 
contentious. Many authors argue that, because of its importance to the 
wellbeing of their offspring, gamete providers have a duty to ensure that 
someone develops the kind of deep intimate relationships with their 
offspring that may give rise to non-transferable responsibilities; however, 
gamete providers do not have an obligation to form these kinds of 
relationships themselves.16 
The case I make for questioning the transferability of responsibilities in 
gamete provision cases differs from the preceding arguments made by 
Weinberg and Nelson in that it does not rest on the content of gamete 
providers’ obligations.17 Instead, my argument follows from the manner in 
which these obligations arise. I take as a starting point a view defended by 
many authors, which is that individuals acquire certain responsibilities 
towards their offspring by virtue of the role they play in bringing them into 
existence. Authors such as David Archard, Fuscaldo, Nelson, Lindsey Porter, 
and Weinberg have all provided largely causal accounts of the relevant 
factors in gamete provisions that give rise to gamete providers’ 
responsibilities towards their offspring.18 These authors defend various 
forms of the general claim that “when one’s free actions put non-
consenting19 individuals at risk of harm, some degree of responsibility 
arises to take steps to reduce the likelihood of those harms occurring, and to 
reduce the severity of those harms if they do occur.” I will call this ‘Principle 
R’. Before arguing why responsibilities acquired in this manner cannot be 
transferred to others, I will briefly explain why I think it is reasonable to 
take Principle R seriously in the context of reproduction. 
2.2 Causal Responsibility and Procreation 
We tend to have strong intuitions that individuals acquire responsibilities 
when they freely act in a manner that results in the creation of children 
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from their gametes; consider for example the scorn levied against men in 
one-night-stand cases who abandon their genetic offspring, or the norms 
that govern child maintenance obligations in these kinds of cases. This 
intuition has traditionally been defended by appealing to the fact that 
children have no choice in being brought into existence, and will suffer in 
the absence of support from others. In other words, Principle R has often 
been appealed to when justifying the claim that reproducers have 
responsibilities towards their offspring. Take for example Kant’s account of 
parental responsibilities, in which Principle R features prominently. Kant 
states, 
[F]rom a practical point of view it is a quite correct and even 
necessary idea to regard the act of procreation as one by which 
we have brought a person into the world without consent and 
on our own initiative, for which deed the parents incur an 
obligation to make the child content with his condition so far as 
they can.20 
A similar justification for the legal obligation to provide child 
maintenance appears in Blackstone’s 18th century Commentaries on the 
Laws of England.21 And more recently Seana Shiffrin has argued that 
procreators have responsibilities towards their offspring that arise from the 
burdens imposed on them by virtue of being brought into existence. Shiffrin 
states,  
“...because procreation involves a nonconsensual 
imposition of significant burdens, it is morally problematic 
and its imposer may justifiably be held responsible for its 
harmful results.”22 
Though the claim that procreators acquire responsibilities on the basis 
of Principle R is quite intuitive in the case of one-night-stands,23 one serious 
theoretical challenge its defenders must overcome is establishing plausible 
criteria for determining what kinds of actions make individuals moral 
procreators in the sense that they acquire responsibilities towards the 
children they are implicated in creating. Clearly, simply being part of a 
causal chain that results in the creation of children ought not to be sufficient 
for the acquisition of procreative responsibilities, and so additional criteria 
beyond causation are necessary for avoiding problems of over-breadth. This 
problem of establishing appropriate constraints on causation simpliciter is 
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noted by Bayne, who goes on to argue that causal theories of parenthood all 
suffer from problems of over-breadth that render them implausible.24 
However, most accounts of causal responsibility appealed to by authors 
arguing that procreative responsibilities arise from gamete provision are 
more nuanced than those dismissed by Bayne. For instance, though Bayne 
attributes a ’but-for’ causal account of procreative responsibilities to 
Nelson, Nelson in fact explicitly rejects this view as too weak.25 Instead 
Nelson gestures towards elements generally considered part of ‘proximate 
causation’ used in legal contexts for delineating the salient elements of a 
causal chain from those that are too ‘distant’ for consideration in analyses of 
responsibility, damages etc. Porter similarly appeals to legal approaches to 
causality when developing her account of procreative responsibilities.26 
Additionally, Weinberg and Fuscaldo have defended accounts of procreative 
responsibility that supplement causality with other features, and have 
argued that these additional features obtain in gamete provision.27 
Though these approaches to resolving the problem of over-breadth in 
causal accounts of procreative responsibilities are not without their own 
challenges,28 they do show that attacking but-for causation is insufficient for 
establishing their implausibility. Additionally, that no unproblematic theory 
of causal responsibility has yet been established ought not on its own lead 
us to the conclusion that individuals never acquire responsibilities on causal 
grounds.29 Such a conclusion would run counter to many deeply held 
intuitions. For instance, if we abandon causal accounts of parenthood then it 
becomes unclear why individuals would have any special moral 
responsibilities30 towards children that are conceived accidentally, say as a 
consequence of a failure of generally reliable contraception. 
Despite problems with establishing the precise conditions under which 
individuals acquire responsibilities arising from the consequences of their 
actions, in general Principle R aligns with widely held intuitions about 
responsibility in reproductive contexts - especially the strong intuitions 
many individuals have about responsibility in one-night-stand cases. At a 
minimum the argument that follows will establish that those who think that 
principle R or some more refined variant establishes that gamete providers 
acquire some responsibilities towards their offspring, (and as noted above, 
many authors do) should also think that these responsibilities cannot be 
transferred to others.  
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3 The Impermissibility of Transfers of 
Responsibility in Gamete Provision 
To begin, it is worth noting that in non-reproductive cases it is often not 
possible for individuals to transfer responsibilities they have to a third 
party. Consider the following example. Sam has a library book that is due. As 
she is about to leave to return it, her brother James asks her for a favour. 
Sam agrees on the condition that James return her library book, which 
James consents to do. Though James is normally very reliable, this time he 
drops the book in the mud. The library determines that the book is 
unsalvageable, and charges Sam’s account the cost of replacing the book. 
It seems implausible that Sam could protest the library charges on the 
basis that she had transferred her responsibility for the book to James. Since 
Sam entered into an agreement with the library to be responsible for the 
book, the library can rightfully seek compensation from her. The fact that 
she engaged another person to help her fulfil this responsibility seems to 
have no effect on the responsibility she has to return the book in good 
condition. Consider this example from the point of view of the library. Since 
the library entered into the agreement with Sam, it seems wrong that it now 
be required to seek compensation from James. To permit this kind of 
transfer would amount to permitting the unilateral alteration of a promise, 
and this seems deeply problematic. In this example, Sam can only delegate 
to James the responsibility of returning the library book, not transfer it.31 
The preceding example demonstrates that transferring to a third-party 
obligations we have towards another person is not always simple. However, 
there are various disanalogies between the case described above and 
gamete provision that might raise doubts about the implications this 
example has for gamete provision. For instance, gamete providers generally 
provide gametes only on the condition that someone else will be 
responsible for the needs of any resulting children. In the book example, 
Sam took out the book independently of any prior agreement with James to 
return it. Additionally, in the case of the book there was a pre-existing 
agreement between Sam and the library that gave rise to Sam’s obligation to 
safeguard and return the book. In gamete provision, there is no such prior 
agreement between the gamete provider and offspring. However, as I will 
show next, even when we create cases that are more analogous to gamete 
provision, transfers of responsibilities do not seem possible. Consider the 
following example. 
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My friend Bob wants to play a light-hearted prank on our colleague 
Michelle by deflating the tyres on her bicycle. Bob does not know which 
bicycle is Michelle’s, nor does he know how to deflate a bicycle tyre, so he 
asks me for assistance. At first I protest, arguing that this might cause 
Michelle a great inconvenience, and refuse to participate. To assuage my 
worries, Bob states that he does not think the prank will inconvenience 
Michelle in any serious way, and promises to take care of any harms that 
might befall Michelle as a consequence of the prank. Since I know Bob is 
generally very trustworthy, I agree. I deflate the front tyre while Bob 
deflates the back tyre. Unbeknownst to either of us, Michelle has a very 
important meeting to get to, and she does not have a bicycle pump with her. 
The only way for her to get to her meeting on time is to take a cab, and 
lacking the funds she asks Bob to provide her with money for the taxi. 
Instead of helping Michelle as promised, Bob uncharacteristically runs off 
leaving me behind. Though I have money on me, I tell Michelle that I 
transferred the responsibility to take care of any harm that arose from the 
prank to Bob, and so I do not have to help. Instead, I encourage her to run 
after Bob. 
Intuitively, this response seems very morally problematic. It is 
implausible to suppose that an agreement I enter into with a third party 
(Bob) can absolve me of my responsibility to help my colleague out of the 
state that I have helped put her in.32 The case against the transfer of 
responsibilities in such cases is strong. But notice that the case against 
transfer in the reproductive context is even stronger. In the reproduction 
case, the gamete provider knows that the intention of the other party (the 
intending parents) is to create a dependent being that will be in need of 
care. If we adjust the bicycle example to reflect this prior knowledge that 
exists in the gamete provision case, it seems to only enhance my 
responsibility to assist Michelle. Consider how we would feel about my 
response following the prank if at the onset I knew that we were disabling 
Michelle’s bicycle on the same day that she has an important meeting 
immediately after work. 
One might object to this analogy on the grounds that the gamete 
provider does not create the dependent child in the same manner that I 
inconvenience Michelle. The gamete provider merely provides the material 
while the physicians and intending parents create the child. However, even 
if we tweak the example to make the analogy even closer it still seems that I 
cannot transfer to Bob my obligation to help Michelle. Imagine that Bob tells 
me his plan, then merely asks me to describe Michelle’s bicycle to him and 
explain to him how to deflate a bicycle tyre. Even with this less direct 
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contribution to the prank, it still seems that I have a responsibility to 
alleviate the ill effects33 that Michelle would otherwise suffer as a 
consequence of having her bicycle temporarily disabled.34 
One worry with the model of responsibility I have advocated is that it 
appears as though Bob escapes responsibility for his actions because I am 
left to fulfill all of Michelle’s needs that arise as a consequence of the prank. 
Once I have paid for the cab, there is nothing left for Bob to do. It thus 
appears that by fulfilling the responsibility I delegated to Bob, I necessarily 
relieve Bob of his responsibility. We might think this is particularly 
problematic because Bob initiated the prank, and promised to be 
responsible for any harms that might arise if anything this seems to make 
Bob more responsible for Michelle’s state than I am. This raises a potential 
problem of fairness. It might seem unfair that I am ‘on the hook’ for 
Michelle’s damages even though Bob was also an active participant and 
even though Bob promised to be responsible for any harms that arose. 
However, my view does not entail that Bob has no responsibilities 
arising from the harms suffered by Michelle, but only that both Bob and I 
are both responsible for ensuring that Michelle is not left suffering from ill 
effects from our prank. Though it is true that if I pay for Michelle’s 
transportation costs Bob will no longer owe her anything, this does not 
mean that both of us were not initially fully responsible for ensuring 
Michelle’s welfare. To give a different example, in a two-parent home, the 
fact that one parent ensures that their child has an adequate dinner does 
not mean that both were not equally responsible for ensuring the child did 
not go to bed hungry. It is perfectly possible for multiple individuals to be 
fully responsible for ensuring that the same responsibility is fulfilled.35 
Furthermore, the fact that I cannot transfer my responsibility to Bob 
does not mean that the promise Bob made is of no consequence. Bob’s 
promise to take care of any harm that befell Michelle requires that he 
compensate me for any costs that I incur while fulfilling my obligation to 
her, even though the promise does not diminish my responsibility to 
Michelle. Consider the library book example again. Though James’ promise 
to return the book cannot free Sam of her responsibility for the book, it does 
require him to compensate her for any costs accrued as a result of his 
carelessness. 
My analysis of the bicycle case thus reveals three different ‘arrows’ of 
moral responsibilities that arise in these kinds of cases. Both Bob and I 
independently have responsibilities to ensure that Michelle is restored back 
to her pre-prank state. These responsibilities arise as a consequence of our 
joint involvement that contributed to the state Michelle found herself in. In 
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addition, as a result of his promise, Bob has a responsibility to me to ensure 
that Michelle’s needs that arise as a consequence of the prank are fulfilled. 
This second responsibility that Bob has does not alter my responsibility to 
Michelle, but it does give me recourse against Bob if he fails to step up and I 
am required to come to Michelle’s aid. For instance, I could reasonably ask 
Bob to compensate me for the cost of the taxi if he runs off and leaves me to 
take care of matters. This shows that Bob has not been completely freed of 
his obligations even if I provide for Michelle’s needs. 
What the bicycle examples show is that the responsibility to minimize 
the harms likely to befall someone that individuals acquire when their free 
actions put an unconsenting person at risk cannot be transferred away. 
Consequently, if one accepts that gamete providers’ actions amounts to 
freely engaging in an activity that places their offspring at risk of harm, 
which as noted earlier is a position held by many, then it seems implausible 
that gamete providers can transfer their responsibilities to intending 
parents. This does not mean that the intending parents are not also 
responsible for the children created by use of others’ gametes, just as Bob 
remains responsible for ensuring Michelle gets to her meeting. 
Though the library and bicycle cases demonstrate that it is not possible 
for individuals to alienate their moral responsibilities through transfer, it 
does leave open the possibility of delegation. For instance, suppose that 
instead of refusing to help Michelle, I instead have another friend give 
Michelle a lift to her meeting. Here it seems that I no longer have an 
obligation to Michelle. Furthermore Michelle does not seem to be wronged 
in anyway by having a third person do all the ‘work’ to ensure that she is not 
left harmed by my joint actions with Bob. So long as we adopt the view that 
creating children does not results in the kind of intimate responsibilities 
suggested by Weinberg, it is plausible that gamete providers can delegate 
their responsibilities to others. 
We are thus left with two possible outcomes, depending on the view 
adopted regarding the kinds of responsibilities that arise from gamete 
provision. If we adopt the more onerous view defended by Weinberg - that 
gamete providers have a responsibility to form close intimate relationships 
with their biological offspring- then neither the transfer nor the delegation 
of all parental responsibilities is possible. If we adopt the less onerous view 
defended by Archard and others, that gamete providers need to ensure that 
someone forms close parental bonds with their offspring and cares for 
them, but that the gamete providers have no duty to do any of the parenting 
tasks themselves, then delegation is possible but transfer is not. In either 
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case gamete providers cannot completely alienate the responsibilities they 
acquire towards their offspring through transfer. 
4 Conclusion 
In this paper I have argued that authors who defend the claim that gamete 
providers can transfer their responsibilities to others have failed to 
properly take into account the distinction between the transfer and 
delegation of responsibilities; in the case of delegation, some responsibility 
is retained by the delegator, while in the case of transfer, responsibility is 
completely alienated by the transferor. Using this distinction, I have shown 
that the examples commonly provided to demonstrate that the kinds of 
responsibilities parents acquire can be easily transferred are actually 
instances of delegation. Lastly, I have argued that an analysis of the manner 
in which gamete providers acquire responsibilities towards their offspring 
reveals that the responsibilities they acquire cannot be transferred. In sum, 
my argument shows that though gamete providers might be able to delegate 
their responsibilities to others, they cannot completely alienate them 
through a transfer to the intending parents. 
This conclusion raises several further issues that I will briefly outline, 
but will not be able to address in full here. First, given that gamete 
providers acquire inalienable responsibilities towards their offspring, some 
detailed account outlining the content of these responsibilities is needed. 
Even at a broad level of generality, it is unclear what such responsibilities 
would entail. For instance, we might think that gamete providers need only 
ensure that their offspring have a minimally decent life, and thus in societies 
with robust social safety nets it is unlikely that they will ever have to act on 
their responsibilities. Conversely, we might think that gamete provider 
might have the responsibility to ensure that their offspring are not made 
worse off as result of the delegation of responsibilities undertaken by their 
progenitors. In this case, gamete providers might have a responsibility to 
provide resources to their genetic offspring if their parent(s) face economic 
hardships not faced by the gamete provider. Additionally, we might think 
that in extreme cases gamete providers might have a responsibility to take 
on the intimate parenting duties themselves, say if their offspring’s parents 
become incapacitated and no other person is available to parent. I admit 
that such cases are unlikely to arise, but it is worth noting that a similar 
kind of case, In Re M.C,36 led California to adopt a law permitting children to 
have more than two parents.37 
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In In Re M.C., the court lamented that because there was no special legal 
recognition of non-parental progenitors, a young child would have to be 
placed in foster care rather than with a genetic progenitor who had 
displayed interest in helping raise her. This case involved a lesbian couple 
who, due to a series of unpleasant and unfortunate events, became unable 
to care for M.C.. M.C. had been conceived during a previous relationship 
between M.C.’s mother, Melissa, and her then partner, Jesus. Jesus had 
helped care for Melissa while she was pregnant, and had voluntarily 
provided child support to Melissa and M.C. at various times. However, since 
Jesus was not a legal parent , he had no standing to request custody when 
M.C.’s parents were no longer able to care for her. Consequently, M.C. was 
placed in the far-from-ideal foster-care system. In response to this case, 
California passed legislation permitting the recognition of more than two 
legal parents when doing so is in the best interest of the child, so that 
situations like this could be avoided in the future. Though not a gamete 
provision case, it is not a significant departure from the relevant facts to 
imagine Jesus as a willing gamete provider who had some involvement in 
the life of his genetic offspring. Given that foster care is far from ideal, this 
case demonstrates that there may be times when gamete providers have the 
responsibility to undertake the job of parenting themselves in cases where 
it is unlikely that the person who was initially delegated that responsibility 
to parent will be able to fulfil that responsibility, and where no other 
competent individual is available or willing to do it. 
Second, it is unclear how law and policy ought to reflect the moral 
responsibilities acquired by gamete providers. Again, there are a variety of 
possibilities that seem plausible. At one extreme, policy may simply remain 
silent on gamete providers’ responsibilities, as is the case with many moral 
responsibilities. Alternatively, the law could enforce these responsibilities 
in much the same manner as it enforces child-maintenance responsibilities. 
If, for example, a child’s parents became destitute, we might think that the 
law ought to be able to demand some kind of financial support (though 
perhaps not to the same degree as standard child support) from a gamete 
provider. Finally, we may think that policy ought to provide a mechanism 
for gamete providers to act on their responsibilities if they so wish, but not 
force them to do so. Anonymously or otherwise, gamete providers could be 
provided with a mechanism for finding out how their offspring are faring, 
and be provided a mechanism (also one that could preserve anonymity) for 
providing financial support to their offspring’s parents. 
Thus while I have shown that gamete providers cannot transfer their 
responsibilities to others, it is not immediately clear what implications this 
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has for gamete provision, both in terms of what moral requirements gamete 
provision places on gamete providers, and what implications it has for 
policy governing assisted reproduction. While I cannot fully flesh out the 
normative implications of my argument in this paper, doing so is a project 
that ought to be taken seriously because of its relevance to ethically-minded 
regulation, and more importantly because of its importance to the wellbeing 
of children created via third-party gametes.38 
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